On May 9, the Russian Embassy in the Republic of Cyprus staged grand celebrations in honor of the main holiday of Putin’s pagan cult of pobedobesiye, the so-called Victory Day — dedicated to an event 85 years ago, to which modern Russia has no relation whatsoever, but which the Kremlin actively uses in propaganda of its own superiority and for the ideological justification of aggression against Ukraine. The culmination of the celebration was the performance of the main ritual of pobedobesiye: the procession of the «Immortal Regiment» column along the Limassol embankment.
Many individuals who deserve close attention from the law enforcement agencies and special services of the European Union took part in the procession. At the head of the marching column walked Lieutenant General of the FSB Murad Zyaziikov, operating in Cyprus under diplomatic cover in the status of the Ambassador of the Russian Federation.
Behind him marched officers of the FSB, SVR, GRU and Rossotrudnichestvo, posing as consular workers, diplomats, attachés of the Russian Embassy, members of the UN peacekeeping contingent in Cyprus and employees of the Russian cultural center.
Golenyev Igor Valeryevich, attaché of the Russian Embassy, GRU colonel
Konstantin Viktorovich Veselov, First Secretary of the Russian Embassy, GRU major
Mikhail Ivanovich Konoplya, FSB officer, assigned to Military Unit 2080 – 75th Aktash Border Detachment, embassy guard
Pavel Olegovich Fokin, in the center, officer of the Russian Ministry of Defense, serving as part of the UN peacekeeping forces in Cyprus
Behind them marched the rest of the mass of admirers of the Russian world in Cyprus, consisting of agents of the Russian special services, agents of influence and useful idiots of Moscow.
Group of members of the «Agronomos» party, agents of influence of Moscow
In the composition of the Kremlin’s fifth column, which was goose-stepping along the embankment of a European city to Soviet military marches and patriotic songs, there were many young people of conscription age. The Center of Investigation and Research (CIR) identified more than two dozen of them. Most turned out to be citizens of the Russian Federation who entered the island on work visas, at the invitation of companies owned by Russian citizens, and on this basis obtained residence permits in the Republic of Cyprus.
Some of them, having lived in the country for more than four years, applied for citizenship of the Republic of Cyprus under the accelerated program. Four of those identified have already received Cypriot passports under this program. One Russian with a Latvian passport was also identified.
Particular attention of CIR was drawn to a solidly built man in an ominous black T-shirt with the image of a snarling bear, densely hung with all kinds of military-patriotic symbols. To our surprise, he turned out to be a high-ranking diplomat — counselor of the Russian Embassy, Dmitry Viktorovich Zubarev. But not quite an ordinary diplomat.
Dmitry Zubarev, in the center, at the celebration of May 9, 2026 in Limassol (photo from the Facebook page of KSORS Cyprus)
In all countries of the world, including Cyprus, the Russian Embassy performs the function of a center of legal intelligence. Legal not because Russian spies engage in lawful intelligence activities, but because they operate under legal diplomatic or other state cover. Residencies of all special services are located there — the 5th Service of the FSB, SVR, GRU, Rossotrudnichestvo.
The main function of the Russian special services operating under legal cover throughout the world is the same and consists of espionage, political and economic influence, bribery of influential persons, recruitment of agents from among the political, military, religious and cultural elite of the host country, manipulation of public opinion, sabotage and destabilization of the situation. After Russia’s attack on Ukraine in February 2022 and the subsequent termination of virtually all official contacts with Russian diplomatic missions in EU countries, the employees of Russian embassies are currently engaged in nothing else.
According to the list of foreign diplomats published in February 2026 by the Cypriot Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Russian Embassy in Nicosia has 39 diplomatic staff — not counting technical personnel and administrative workers. Together with technical personnel and administrative workers, data on whom are not published, the total number of employees of the Russian diplomatic mission, according to various accounts, may reach up to 300 people, which makes it one of the largest Russian diplomatic missions abroad. For comparison: the Cypriot Embassy in Moscow has only four diplomats, including the ambassador.
Of the 39 diplomats listed, 7 embassy employees have the status of counselor. According to the unofficial comparison of Russian diplomatic ranks with military ranks, counselor of the 1st class corresponds to the rank of colonel, and counselor of the 2nd class — lieutenant colonel. According to data available to CIR, at least 5 counselors of the Russian Embassy in Nicosia hold the military ranks of colonels of the Russian special services.
CIR studied information received from sources on condition of anonymity, leak data and information from open sources concerning the counselor of the Russian Embassy in Nicosia, Dmitry Zubarev.
It was not possible to learn Zubarev’s biography from open sources. There is no information anywhere about his education and diplomatic career, which is unusual for a career diplomat. The complete absence of information about the work biography of an employee of a diplomatic mission can itself be considered an indirect sign that the diplomat is in fact an officer of Russian intelligence.
According to open data, Dmitry Zubarev has been in Cyprus at least since 2017. At that time he had the diplomatic status of First Secretary and in September of the same year took part in the Best Legal conference organized by the Russian agent of influence Natalya Kardash.
Much more information about Zubarev’s activities was provided by the study of leaks from Russian databases. The totality of the information contained in them indicates that Dmitry Viktorovich Zubarev is an officer of Russian military intelligence, better known to the general public under the abbreviation GRU.
In the list of addresses at which he was registered, particular attention is drawn to the address: «Marshal Biryuzov Street, building 4, building 3». In official Moscow documents, the facility at this address is listed as «FGKVOU VPO ‘Military Academy of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation’, military town No. 80a».
In July 2026, The Insider, investigating the activities of the identified GRU officer Maxim Filchenkov, directly calls the facility at this address the officers’ dormitory of the Military Diplomatic Academy — the academy of Russian military intelligence, known as the «Conservatory» of the GRU.
In this dormitory during his studies at the academy lived Anatoly Chepiga (Ruslan Boshirov), a GRU officer who poisoned with «Novichok» the Russian ex-spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter in the United Kingdom in 2018, and also blew up a weapons depot in the Czech Republic in 2014.
In the same list of addresses, no less attention is drawn to another address at which Zubarev was registered: «Kirovogradskaya Street, building 25, building 1». At this address is the dormitory of the Russian State University for the Humanities.
GRU Colonel Anatoly Chepiga was also registered at this address during his studies at the academy. In 2009, Chepiga was transferred to Moscow and became a student of the third faculty of the Military Diplomatic Academy. He and his family were registered as a student in the RSUH dormitory. The GRU leadership decided to register officers at civilian addresses instead of the compromised departmental dormitories of the academy. That is, Kirovogradskaya, 25/1 was used as a cover registration address for a military intelligence officer during training at the GRU Military Diplomatic Academy.
There is every reason to believe that in Zubarev’s case the address of the RSUH dormitory was used for the same purposes.
Interesting facts from Zubarev’s life do not end there. According to the same leaks from Russian official databases, he is not listed on the staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation as a «diplomat» and is not assigned to any military unit as a serviceman. His place of work is indicated as the «Rostec» corporation.
There is nothing surprising in this. As a military intelligence officer, Zubarev is assigned to the Russian state corporation «Rostec» — the main and largest manufacturer and supplier of weapons, military and special equipment in Russia, as an officer of the active reserve.
Our reference:
Officers of the active reserve are career employees of the special services (in the USSR — the KGB, in Russia — the FSB, SVR and GRU) who are officially seconded to work in civilian ministries and departments, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (embassies, consulates), the Ministry of Economic Development, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Aeroflot, TASS, scientific institutes or commercial structures — under «cover». Formally they are not on the staff of the special services, but continue to receive a salary there, military ranks and perform operational tasks.
At some period Dmitry Zubarev was assigned to JSC «Rosoboronexport», which functions as a structural subdivision of «Rostec».
The specifics of the activities of the «Rostec» corporation and especially «Rosoboronexport» are directly related to military intelligence. GRU officers under diplomatic or commercial cover oversee the supply of military equipment, assess the condition and needs of foreign armies, obtain secret information, and recruit agents. In addition, they commit sabotage against infrastructure facilities, as well as defense plants and weapons depots in the West, organize assassination attempts on the heads of military production, suppliers of weapons in NATO countries, destabilize the situation in various countries, organize mass riots, strikes, military coups and civil wars.
It is precisely for this reason that in the leaks the place of work of the «diplomat» Zubarev is indicated as the state corporation «Rostec» and «Rosoboronexport», and not the Russian MFA and not the number of a military unit of Russian military intelligence.
Zubarev’s internal passport was issued by the Pechenga District Department of Internal Affairs, and his TIN belongs to the Murmansk Region. The Pechenga District of the Murmansk Region is a closed border territory closed to visits, an area of concentration of Northern Fleet formations. In the village of Sputnik in the Pechenga District there were radio intelligence posts of the 2051st Separate Radio-Technical Battalion, Military Unit 25605, which belonged to the system of military intelligence — the GRU of the General Staff, along the OSNAZ line (radio and radio-technical intelligence). Dmitry Zubarev served in this unit.
Zubarev’s email address also arouses curiosity — conruszdv@gmail.com. Judging by the name of the email, it may be related to JSC «NPP ‘Konrus'». However, Zubarev has been using this email no later than 2020, while JSC NPP «KONRUS» was established in April 2024. Probably CONRUS existed as the name of some project long before the registration of the JSC, and Zubarev had a relation to it.
According to information from sources familiar with Zubarev’s activities, he is responsible for the supply of sanctioned equipment and components for the Russian army and the military-industrial complex of Russia in circumvention of sanctions. He was seconded to Cyprus to develop circumvention schemes and control supply routes through Cypriot companies controlled by the Russian special services. We remind you: «Rostec» came under Western sanctions back in 2014. Restrictions against the state corporation were introduced after the annexation of Crimea and the start of the war in eastern Ukraine.
He also does not forget about his official duties in the field of military-industrial espionage. He is particularly interested in new Western developments in the field of unmanned aerial vehicles.
On January 23–24, 2023, the first exhibition-conference on defense and security issues BATTLEFIELD ReDEFiNED was held in Limassol under the auspices of the Ministry of Defense of Cyprus and the Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Zubarev was noticed at the event. He carefully examined the presented samples of weapons and military equipment, established contacts with representatives of a number of manufacturers of military equipment and recorded everything he saw using a hidden camera.
Zubarev among the visitors of the exhibition
In December 2024, the second exhibition-conference on defense and security Defense ReDEFiNED was held in Nicosia under the auspices of the Ministry of Defense of Cyprus and the Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and Industry. The exhibition was attended by the President of the Republic of Cyprus Nikos Christodoulides and the command of the National Guard of the Republic.
And this time Dmitry Zubarev was noticed among the visitors of the exhibition.
Zubarev in the background, extreme left, with half of his face covered
He was most interested in the products of the company CyRIC USGS, which is engaged in the design, development and production of modern unmanned aerial and ground vehicles and platforms for search and reconnaissance operations, defense, control over critically important infrastructure facilities, as well as for the purposes of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). Zubarev talked with company representatives, asked them several questions and exchanged business cards with the managers of CyRIC USGS. Whether he managed to recruit any of them and obtain secret documentation from them is not reliably known.
How a Russian diplomat, after the start of the full-scale war against Ukraine and the entire Western world in February 2022, the introduction of large-scale sanctions against Russia and the termination of contacts with Russian diplomatic missions, managed to gain access to an exhibition where the latest developments, technologies and equipment in the field of defense and security were demonstrated remains a mystery.
Taking advantage of the lack of interest in his person on the part of the local special services and, as a consequence, complete freedom of action, Zubarev, while in Cyprus, performs the usual functions of a military intelligence officer under diplomatic cover. According to a source in one of the European special services, he oversees an extensive agent network in Europe created back in the times of the USSR. This network includes persons involved in the supply of military equipment and components for the Russian army in circumvention of sanctions. The island is ideally suited for this work. Here Zubarev freely holds meetings with recruited GRU agents from other EU countries who come to him in Cyprus under the guise of tourists.