Hungary is entering the final stage of its parliamentary election campaign amid growing uncertainty. Many observers believe that this time, the results could prove extremely unfavorable for Viktor Orbán’s ruling regime.
For the Kremlin and its affiliated circles in Budapest, these elections are more than just a routine democratic transfer of power. If Orbán’s Fidesz party loses its majority in the Hungarian parliament, it will mean the loss of the Hungarian-Russian veto in the European Union and a weakening of Russian influence over EU and NATO decisions.
This is precisely why, recognizing the real possibility of Fidesz’s defeat, Moscow has mobilized significant resources to support Hungary’s incumbent Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. The campaign employs technologies and approaches that were previously used primarily in domestic elections within Russia itself.
The Kremlin, and indeed the Hungarian prime minister himself, fully understand the critical nature of the situation, which is why the Russian side is doing everything possible to boost Fidesz’s ratings and keep Viktor Orbán in power.
According to The Financial Times, the Russian consulting firm “Social Design Agency” (Social Design Agency, SDA) has quickly developed a social media campaign strategy. Its goal is to minimize the likelihood of Orbán’s defeat and undermine voters’ trust in his main opponent—the Tisza party and its leader, Péter Mádár.
The gravity of the situation is underscored by the fact that one of the Kremlin’s key curators of political projects—Sergei Kirienko, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Russian Presidential Administration—is in charge of the operation in Hungary. Vadim Titov, head of the Russian Presidential Directorate for Strategic Partnerships and Cooperation, has been appointed as the direct implementer.
The new office has de facto become the center for exporting Russian political influence abroad. The “Hungarian project” has turned into a testing ground for Russia to refine new methods of hybrid intervention. For Titov, this is his debut in a new role, so maximum involvement and the use of the most modern tools and new methods of hybrid influence are expected.
Aware of the gravity of his responsibilities, Vadim Titov personally visited Hungary in the second half of March, accompanied by Ilya Gambashidze, Denis Tyurin, and Oleg Smirnov.
Ilya Gambashidze, founder of the “Social Design Agency” (SDA; both entities are subject to U.S. sanctions), is developing Viktor Orbán’s information policy plans. It is reasonable to assert that he is the chief architect of “digital sabotage.”
Under his leadership, the team developed a “black PR” strategy against Péter Mádjári, which involves creating content to demonize Viktor Orbán’s opponents as much as possible.
Denis Tyurin heads the company “InfoRos,” which is registered in Russia and manages the websites InfoRos.ru, Infobrics.org, and OneWorld.press. These sites are part of the ecosystem of anti-Western propaganda and disinformation.
As part of their assigned role, Denis Tyurin’s organization created a network of websites purporting to represent supposedly authoritative think tanks. The content from these resources is subsequently readily cited by Hungarian state media as evidence of “external conspiracies” against Hungary.
Oleg Smirnov is believed to be a career intelligence officer of the Russian Federation and serves as a liaison between Russian political strategists and Hungarian operatives on the ground. Furthermore, his activities are aimed at integrating Russian talking points into Hungary’s official narrative.
All these facts show that high-ranking Russian officials, Kremlin-affiliated structures, and representatives of Russian intelligence are actively working toward a very clear goal: to ensure Viktor Orbán’s continued hold on power and the usefulness of Péter Szijjártó as a counterpart to Minister Sergey Lavrov.
It is precisely this behind-the-scenes activity that significantly expands Viktor Orbán’s team’s capabilities for political and informational manipulation, as well as for carrying out highly dangerous socio-political experiments, including those aimed at inciting hostility toward neighboring countries.
In this regard, it is worth mentioning the special role played in the “Hungarian project” by representatives of the Russian Association of Political Consultants. Its distinguished experts, represented by current president Firdus Aliyev, board member Grigory Kazankov, and subcontractors from the Russian Expert Institute for Social Research, are involved in creating the ideological framework of the “Hungarian project,” selecting instruments of influence, and identifying implementers.
Under their leadership, the campaign for Viktor Orbán was based on the exploitation of war fears—a tactic typical of Russian tactics—and the creation of an “besieged fortress” image. This formed the core message: “If Orbán loses, Hungary will be dragged into war.”
They also carried out the selection of agents for “digital sabotage.” For example, Yevgeny Shevchenko, the creator of the disinformation network “Pravda,” and Yulia Serebryanskaya, known for her questionable role in the Romanian elections and linked to the advertising company AdNow. This pair provides access to infrastructure and facilitates the dissemination of “toxic” and socially dangerous content.
In the Kremlin’s “Hungarian project,” under Yevgeny Shevchenko’s leadership, an ecosystem of clone websites mimicking local media operates. Using the “Pravda” network, “information noise” is generated, where real news is mixed with fabricated stories about “sinister EU/NATO plans against Hungary” or “Magyars preparing mass riots.”
Through Yulia Serebryanskaya and her connections, technical tools are provided for mass mailings and targeted advertising that bypass Meta and Google’s security algorithms. This allows “toxic” content to appear directly in the feeds of Hungarian social media users, creating the illusion of mass support for Orbán and disappointment in the opposition.
Orbán’s anti-Ukrainian rhetoric—hundreds of anti-Ukrainian billboards, the incident involving an attack on Ukrainian cash collectors—fuels fears that Russian strategists may be preparing provocations.
Possible scenarios include discrediting international observers, particularly Ukrainian ones, as well as attempts to challenge the election results in the event of a Fidesz defeat by accusing “foreign interference.”